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THE MOST CREATIVE MOMENTS IN
THE HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: "THE WHATS"
William H. Rodgers, Jr. *
In preparation for this symposium piece, Professor Rodgers
asked a number of his colleagues active in the field of environmental
law to identify what they considered to be the most creative moments
in the history of environmental law. He gave no specific instructions
with his request other than providing a definition of what he consid-
ered to be a creative moment: "A legal initiative that advances envi-
ronmental law with a new level of analysis, new structure, or new in-
stitutional bridge. "
This article is a compilation of the numerous responses the
author received. The responses formulate a detailed and informative
description of many aspects of the history and development of envi-
ronmental law. To organize the piece, Professor Rodgers separates
the creative moments into nine categories. He then concludes the arti-
cle with a list of the ten most creative moments in the history of envi-
ronmental law.
"You did not understand the moderation expected of a Tennessee
law professor."
Zygmunt Plater, professor of law, Boston College Law School, Feb.
2, 1998, explaining his firing for participation in the snail darter case.1
"I lose cases for good causes."
Claire Cummings, Mill Valley, California, Mar. 10, 1998.2
• Stimson Bullitt Professor of Environmental Law, University of Washington School of Law.
A companion article, entitled "The Most Creative Moments in the History of Environmental Law:
The 'Whys,"' appears in the Washburn Law Journal, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1999). Appreciation is ex-
pressed to Katherine Drews, Class of 1999, University of Washington School of Law, for assistance in
preparation of this article.
1. Electronic mail from Zygmunt Plater, Professor, Boston College Law School, to William H.
Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Feb. 2, 1998) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Illinois Law Review).
2. Electronic mail from Claire Cummings, Attorney, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor,
University of Washington School of Law (Mar. 10, 1998) (on file with the University of Illinois Law
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"I love this statute."
Nancy Marks, senior attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council,
March 12, 1998, on the citizen suit provisions of the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA).3
"The creativity in our field still comes from that petri dish which is
its practice."
Oliver A. Houck, professor of law, Tulane Law School, Jan. 13,
1998.'
"Couldn't we call it 'technology encouraging' or something. It
sounds so harsh."
An EPA assistant administrator to John Bonine, as recalled Feb. 12,
1998.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In a careless impulse some time ago, I asked a number of people
working in the field to respond to a survey on the creative moments in
the history of environmental law.6 My definition of a "creative moment"
was "a legal initiative that advances environmental law with a new level
of analysis, new structure, or new institutional bridge."7 A creative mo-
ment, thus defined, can be an idea, statute, article, strategy, or case.
To further tease forth an understanding of creative moments, I
asked my respondents to identify their own noteworthy contributions.'
There was danger in this approach, however. Whatever one hears about
the modesty of lawyers, many understate their own roles because of a re-
tiring nature or because of a recognition that no wheel can spin without
assistance from many helpful agents. Yet I took the chance with the per-
sonal question for two reasons. I had hoped to acquire insight into the
entrepreneurial work that goes into successful navigation of these com-
plex laws; and I had suspected, as stated in my solicitation letter, that a
Review).
3. Letter from Nancy S. Marks, Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, to William H.
Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Mar. 12, 1998) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Illinois Law Review) (referring specifically to 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(a)(1)(8), 7002(a)(1)(B)
(1994)).
4. Letter from Oliver A. Houck, Professor, Tulane Law School, to William H. Rodgers, Jr.,
Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Jan. 13, 1998) (on file with the University of Illi-
nois Law Review).
5. Electronic Mail from John Bonine, Professor of Law, University of Oregon, to William H.
Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Feb. 12, 1998) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Illinois Law Review).
6. A copy of the survey letter is on file with the University of Illinois Law Review. Respondents
included 75 individuals from both the practice and academic sides of environmental law. The names
are also on file with the vote tabulations. (Each respondent was asked to identify six creative mo-
ments.) The top ten "creative moments" are identified at the end of this article.
7. Id.
& See id.
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divergence often exists between recognition and contribution as judged
by the contributor. Additionally, some ideas are slow to catch on or may
never catch on at all. Fortuity, time, and fixed interests play: a role.
There were hindrances to the completion of this project. First, a
survey cannot begin to capture the fantastic creativity wrapped up in the
careers of the 27,502 people who now describe themselves as environ-
mental lawyers.9 "For every issue," Oliver Houck reminded us, "hun-
dreds of them, there are sung and unsung heroes, creators, synthesizers,
movers, kamikazes, and deal-cutters."1 Second, there are few discernible
watershed "moments" when inventiveness decisively overtakes the mun-
dane. As Arnold Reitze observed, "the E=MC2 type of breakthrough
does not seem to be a significant part of environmental law; slow evolu-
tion from endless labor in the environmental vineyard over many years
by many people is what produces change.""i Third and finally, measuring
creative input is difficult. As Claire Cummings explained, it is more diffi-
cult to have a good idea and lead another to think it was his idea than to
simply have a good idea. 12 Much creativity is thus undetectable.
Several respondents observed that opinion hides in the judgment of
whether a particular innovation, advances the cause of environmental
law.13 Few endeavors are unequivocally benign. There is no doubt also
that environmental laws can be disassembled and rolled under with the
same creative fervor that brought them into being. William Buzbee ac-
knowledged the anti-environmental genius that undergirds the work of
Justice Antonin Scalia: "When one scrutinizes his citations and explana-
tions for earlier cases, the creativity of the new framework becomes
readily apparent. The Steel Company opinions reveal just how much he
has changed the litigation terrain through his new standing framework."' 4
9. To this list should be added 736 government lawyers and 8226 law firms who claim the spe-
cialty, according to Martindale-Hubbell. The West Legal Directory counts 28,501 individuals and law
firms with a specialty in environmental law. Search of Westlaw, WLD-ALL (June 28, 1999).
10. Houck, supra note 4.
11. Letter from Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Professor, The George Washington School of Law, to
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Jan. 15, 1997) (on file
with the University of Illinois Law Review); see also Letter from Gregory Frank Cook, Attorney, to
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Feb. 12, 1998) (on file
with the University of Illinois Law Review) ("[I]t would not be fair to give me credit for what is really
nothing more than a tiny portion of a sweeping curve on the screen of history.").
12. See Cummings, supra note 2.
13. See generally Cook, supra note 11 (noting personal contributions to the public trust doctrine
with a disclaimer because the ideas "advanced have not yet taken hold and may never do so"); Letter
from Howard Latin, Professor, Rutgers University School of Law, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Profes-
sor, University of Washington School of Law (Jan. 23, 1998) (on file with the University of Illinois Law
Review) (assuming the survey was looking for "creative moments" that "advanced environmental law"
and not "creatively BAD moments"); Electronic mail from Ronald H. Rosenberg, Professor, Mar-
shall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, Uni-
versity of Washington School of Law (Mar. 4, 1998) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review)
(assuming the request is for moments that are "creative and helpful to the environment in some way"
(emphasis added)).
14. Electronic Mail from William Buzbee, Associate Professor, Emory University School of
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Buzbee also spotted some intellectual deception in the attack on com-
mand and control as going wrong in its prescription of a particular tech-
nology:
Actual mandates of particular technology are the exception, not the
rule. Furthermore, often it is industry that seeks a technological
mandate to reduce concerns about liability. I think this creative dis-
tortion of the usual strategies and mechanisms of environmental
laws has in an ongoing way transformed the rhetoric of debates
over environmental laws. 5
A number of respondents seconded the notion that recognition is a
fickle and unreliable indicator of achievement. 6 Most people find it diffi-
cult to understand that they will be best remembered for what they did
not do. They decline credit for achievements that grow out of the small
errors of history, they express amazement that their serious endeavors
can be set aside while their trifling assertions are lionized, and they re-
gret that their best ideas are relegated to oblivion by a quirky public
opinion or sentenced to death by a scheming judicial elite.
Among the lost causes identified in my survey are Michael Ger-
rard's proposals for an integrated scheme for disposing of all hazardous
and radioactive wastes ("zero impact"); 7 Joseph Sax's disclosure that the
government pays dearly for its strategy of delay in land acquisition ("no
one ever noticed at all"); John Costonis's elaboration of the "urge to
preserve" ("The world, sadly, has yet to appreciate the power of my in-
sight"); 9 Claire Cummings's attempts to enforce cultural conservation
easements to protect native cultural and natural resources ("I lose cases
for good causes");' Michael Doherty's enthusiasm for the Great Ape
Project ("My professor couldn't see how establishing that nonhuman
primates and cetaceans have rights would have anything to do with the
Law, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (June 2, 1998)
(on file with the University of Illinois Law Review).
15. Id.
16. See generally Cummings, supra note 2 (noting the "difference between recognition and inno-
vation" especially as her own work and contributions "show up in other people's work"); Letter from
Eric R. Glitzenstein, Attorney, Meyer & Glitzenstein, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, Univer-
sity of Washington School of Law (Apr. 1, 1998) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review)
(noting the phenomenon of larger environmental groups, who have declined to be involved in certain
litigation, taking credit for victories); Reitze, supra note 11 (commenting that he "wrote quickly and
invested very little effort" in some of his most recognized works).
17. Letter from Michael B. Gerrard, Attorney, Arnold & Porter, to William H. Rodgers, Jr.,
Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Jan. 20, 1998) (on file with the University of Illi-
nois Law Review).
18. Letter from Joseph L. Sax, Professor, Boalt Hall, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, Uni-
versity of Washington School of Law (Mar. 10, 1998) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Re-
view).
19. Letter from John J. Costonis, Chancellor, Paul M. Herbert Law Center, Louisiana State Uni-
versity, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (June 10, 1998)
(on file with the University of Illinois Law Review) (discussing JOHN J. COSTONIS, ICONS AND ALIENS:
LAW, AESTHETICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE (1989)).
20. Cummings, supra note 2.
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environment");21 B. Michael Gendler and David Bricklin's formulation
of a substantive (NEPA) standard that the Supreme Court wanted no
part of ("The substantive standard would have been: an agency decision
* which does not include identified mitigation measures without explana-
tion is arbitrary and capricious");22 George Coggin's and Robert
Glicksman's exposure of the crass illegalities in the administration of the
Land and Water Conservation Fund ("completely ignored");23 Kenneth
Manaster's splendid book on environmental protection and justice ("no
hint of honorable mention");24 and Patrick Parenteau's monuments to
failed litigation- that dams are "point sources" under section 301 of the
Clean Water Act (CWA) and that oil and gas leases are "irretrievable
commitments" under section 7(d) of the Endangered Species Act
(ESA).25
To lend some order to this vibrant field, part II of this article breaks
down the compiled creative moments into several categories of en-
deavor- risk-takers, mimics, optimists, symbolists, geniuses, subversives,
leveragers and opportunists, paradigm shifters, and workaholics. These
categories are then used to explain the survey results. Part III concludes
by listing ten nominees for the most creative moments in environmental
law.
21. Electronic mail from Michael Doherty, Attorney, B.C. Public Interest Advocacy Centre, to
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Feb. 12, 1998) (on file
with the University of Illinois Law Review).
22. Electronic mail from B. Michael Gendler, Attorney, Bricklin & Gendler, to William H. Rod-
gers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Mar. 10, 1998) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Illinois Law Review).
23. Letter from Robert L. Glicksman, Professor, University of Kansas School of Law, to William
H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Dec. 31, 1997) (on file with the
University of Illinois Law Review).
24. Letter from Kenneth A. Manaster, Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law, to Wil-
liam H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Feb. 13, 1998) (on file with
the University of Illinois Law Review) (referring to KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND JUSTICE: READINGS AND COMMENTARY ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE
(1995)).
25. Letter from Patrick Parenteau, Director, Environmental Law Center, Vermont Law School,
to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Jan. 9, 1998) (on file
with the University of Illinois Law Review); see Clean Water Act of 1948 § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311
(1994); Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1536; see also North Slope Borough v. An-
drus, 486 F. Supp. 326,329 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding that the issuance of a preliminary injunction against
the sale of oil and gas leases in the outer continental shelf would detrimentally affect Alaska's eco-
nomic interests, despite the public's interest in preserving the bowhead whale under the ESA and the
NEPA and that final relief would be sufficient to vindicate the public).
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II. CATEGORIES OF CREATIVITY
A. Risk Takers
Risk taking is a strategy of the underdog. It is everywhere in envi-
ronmental law, and it takes many forms - in career choices, in litigation,
and in day-to-day behavior.
Matt Kenna, an attorney in Durango, Colorado, spoke of taking the
plunge into an environmental practice:
My most creative contribution is not actually that creative, but per-
haps somewhat bold, and that was to start my own private public-
interest law firm, representing [environmental] groups for free and
living off statutory attorney fees from the other side. Many others
have done this, so it is not "creative" (i.e., original), but it is creative
in that by doing this, I have been able to prosecute many cases that
there simply would not have been time for others to do- by creat-
ing a job rather than filling an open position somewhere. And I cre-
ated my partner's job too, so that's two [contributions] - hopefully
more in the future. My hope is that the firm will outlive my partici-
pation in it. 6
Eric Glitzenstein, of Meyer & Glitzenstein in Washington, D.C., ex-
plained his 1992 challenge (on an Administrative Procedure Act "unrea-
sonable" delay theory) of the Fish and Wildlife Service's foot dragging in
the listing of "candidate" species under the ESA.27 The case was signifi-
cant, as Glitzenstein explained, because:
[t]he lawsuit resulted in a landmark settlement - still in existence -
which overhauled the ESA listing process, expedited listing deci-
sions on over 400 species (all of the existing "candidate species" at
the time of the lawsuit), and made many other salutary changes to
the ESA listing process which remain in effect today. As far as I
know, this is the most far-reaching "programmatic" ESA lawsuit
ever done, certainly with [regard] to the listing of endangered and
threatened species. '
Viewed prospectively, however, the case was a high-risk one. As
Glitzenstein elaborated:
We had an enormously difficult time convincing any of the large,
mainstream environmental groups to join this case; most said that
the systemic approach we were suggesting was untenable and that
the relief we were asking - extending to all existing candidate spe-
cies - was too extreme. Defenders of Wildlife and the Fund for
26. Letter from Matt Kenna, Attorney, Kenna & Hickox, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor,
University of Washington School of Law (Mar. 18, 1998) (on file with the University of Illinois Law
Review).
27. Glitzenstein, supra note 16 (discussing Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 958 F. Supp. 670
(D.D.C. 1997)).
28. Id.
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Animals were the only national groups which we could ultimately
persuade to join the case (along with the grass roots conservation-
ists, who are usually inclined to be much more "creative").29
With victory safely in hand, all risks were abated. Glitzenstein
added that caution:
did not prevent other national groups from claiming credit for our
suit, including in fundraising appeals. In the most extraordinary ex-
ample, The Wilderness Society announced the case as one of its
major victories in its annual report to members. We found this to be
rather amazing, since not only did the Society have nothing to do
with the case but it had expressly rejected our overture that it become
a plaintiff on the grounds that the case was too risky and radical.
When we complained on behalf of the groups who had been willing
to take a risk with the litigation, the Society issued a small correc-
tion in a subsequent issue of its newsletter."
Another tale of unappreciated risk taking comes courtesy of Donald
Large, who was involved in the sovereign immunity lawsuit of Sierra
Club v. Hickel.31 The "interesting thing in this [case,]" Large reported,
"was that the government was arguing that the decision (to swap a wild-
life refuge to a nuclear power developer) was 'committed to agency dis-
cretion' by law."32 But the plaintiffs themselves had called Secretary of
the Interior Stewart Udall as a witness.3 Udall had admitted on the
stand, Large recalled, "that he had NOT exercised his discretion[;] in
fact ... he had only approved'the land swap because [President] Lyndon
Johnson was leaning on him and making threats."' Here was a true pro-
file in courage. Such courage is frequently seen in environmental cases.
Academics are not immune from the high risks of environmental
law. Professor Frank Skillern of the Texas Tech University School of
Law stepped on one legal land mine disguised as a rider to an appropria-
tion bill.3 As Skillern explained:
The rider prohibits state funds being spent on salary or benefits of
state employees who are retained or serve as expert witnesses or
consultants in litigation against the State. It's almost remarkable for
its brevity and simplicity... ! I was consulting pro bono with a
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Letter from Donald W. Large, Professor, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark
College, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Jan. 8, 1998)
(on file with the University of Illinois Law Review) (discussing Sierra Club v. Hickel, 467 F.2d 1048
(6th Cir. 1972)); see also Donald Large, Is Anybody Listening? The Problem of Access in Environ-
mental Litigation, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 62, 98 [hereinafter Large, Anybody Listening?].
32. Large, supra note 31.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. See Letter from Frank F. Skillern, Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law, to Wil-
liam H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Jan. 13, 1998) (on file with
the University of Illinois Law Review).
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neighborhood association that was challenging a local wood shutter
company that wanted to burn its usable wood waste. The group had
three lines of attack: oppose administratively the company's appli-
cation for an air quality permit from the Texas Natural Resources
Conservation Commission [TNRCC]; a lawsuit in Austin contesting
the TNRCC's issuance of a standard exemption permitting the
company to burn its wastes while the permit application was pend-
ing; and challeng[e], first before the [Zoning Appeals Board] and
then in court, the [c]ity's determination that incineration was an
"accessory use" under the local ordinance. I was told that I had to
discontinue all contact with the group [by December 31, 1997,] or
run the risk of losing my salary for at least one and possibly two
years. I contacted a lawyer who was representing a marketing pro-
fessor ... who was a paid expert witness for the tobacco industry in
its suit with the state. We decided that I would intervene in his case
to add the issues of whether the rider applies to pro bono consulting
work and whether an administrative hearing and suit against the
city were "litigation against the state." The State Comptroller was
added as a defendant since the rider was to the appropriations bill
and prohibits expenditures of funds; we had heard that key politi-
cians would enforce the rider by cutting out newspaper stories on
high profile cases (as mine is locally) and [sending] them to the
[state comptroller] with direction to stop salaries.36
Zygmunt Plater and his colleague Don Cohen found it necessary to
leave the faculty at the University of Tennessee because of involvement
in the snail darter litigation.37 "You did not understand the moderation
expected of a Tennessee law professor" is the message that Plater re-
membered. 8 According to Professor Plater, President Carter was not
among the Tellico risk takers. He had drafted a veto message of the pork
barrel appropriations rider that repealed protective laws and ordered
completion of the reservoir.39 But President Carter did not deliver, fear-
ing the editorial cartoonists who would place a killer rabbit in one hand
and a snail darter in the other.' President Carter told Plater that "he
thought he didn't have enough political clout to override the subcommit-
tee chairman... who was insisting that this public works project not be
stopped on the economic merits, even though the God Committee had
unanimously found that the dam was a turkey."41
36. Id.
37. See Plater, supra note 1. Other law professors have suffered on the job for their activism,
including Mark Squillace of the University of Wyoming. See Marc Lumpkin, Children Protest Law
Professor Defending Anti-Logging Interests, LARAMIE DAILY BOOMERANG (Wyoming), July 19, 1994
("Nearly 30 children from families who are supported by the timber industry paraded in front of the
University of Wyoming Law School Monday afternoon protesting an environmental law professor.").
38. Plater, supra note 1.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. Id.
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B. Mimicry
The creative side of mimicry is to discover new applications for set-
tled concepts. Environmental attorneys do this daily in their relentless
pursuit of the possible. Among the new domains opened up in this fash-
ion are Steven Davison's demonstration that government bodies can
commit prohibited "takings" under the ESA;42 Judson Starr's establish-
ment of an environmental crimes unit in the Justice Department;43 the
extension of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA) principle to the Coastal Barrier Re-
sources Act ("You build, you clean up the mess");' the clever repetition
of the common law in RCRA's citizen suits for "imminent and substan-
tial" endangerment;45 the similar extension of nuisance law to the inter-
national realm in the Trail Smelter Case between the United States and
Canada;46 and the use of NEPA to incorporate the analysis of sprawl im-
pacts and land-use alternatives into the hard fabrics of highway plan-
ning.47
42. Electronic mail from Steven G. Davison, Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law,
to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Jan. 14, 1998) (on file
with the University of Illinois Law Review); see Steven G. Davison, Alteration of Wildlife Habitat as a
Prohibited Taking Under the Endangered Species Act, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 155, 186 (1995)
[hereinafter Davison, Wildlife Habitat]; Lawrence R. Liebesman & Steven Davison, Takings of Wild-
life Under the Endangered Species Act After Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Greater Oregon, 5 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 137, 151 n.72 (1995); see also Loggerhead Turtle v. County
Council, 148 F.3d 1231, 1242 (11th Cir. 1998) (with Prof. Davison as co-counsel) (finding that the
council had exceeded the bounds of its incidental takings permit); Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 163
(1st Cir. 1997) (finding that Massachusetts's fishing regulatory scheme exacted a taking in violation of
the ESA).
43. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR & WATER 604-05 (1986); see
also Letter from Michael Baram, Director, Center for Law and Technology, Boston University School
of Law, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Feb. 25, 1998)
(on file with the University of Illinois Law Review) (pointing out that the DOJ's 1991 criteria for
criminal prosecution established responsibilities of corporate management for internal regulatory
compliance programs and have prompted self-auditing, self-policing, and voluntary reporting).
44. Parenteau, supra note 25; see Elise Jones, The Coastal Barrier Resource Act A Common
Cents Approach to Coastal Protection, 21 ENVTL. L. 1015 (1991).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1994); see Marks, supra note 3 ("I love this statute and have been
using it in ways perhaps unforeseen by Congress, because it is the only citizen suit provision that di-
rectly addresses harm, rather than some polluter's compliance with a flawed regulatory system that
may or may not connect to the environmental problems at issue.").
46. See Electronic mail from Stephen McCaffrey, Professor, University of the Pacific, McGeorge
School of Law, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Feb.
13, 1998) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review) (referring to the Trail Smelter Case (U.S.
v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941)).
47. See Electronic mail from Keith Bartholomew, 1000 Friends of Oregon, to William H. Rod-
gers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Feb. 24, 1998) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Illinois Law Review). Joseph Feller, a professor at the Arizona State University College of Law,
is another creative mimic who has extended the NEPA apparatus into the domain of cattle grazing and
its environmental impacts; see also National Environmental Policy Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4347.
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The Council on Environmental Quality's 1979 NEPA rules are a
wonderful example of creative mimicry.48 The laws were based partly on
reported case law,4 9 partly on a search for "consensus,"50 and partly on an
imaginative configuration of what might be. 1 They have endured and
matured and have been accepted as a legal work of art.
Second perhaps to NEPA, the public trust doctrine is sufficiently
abstract and malleable to invite application in novel contexts. A nice ex-
ample is the invention under duress of the Yannacone-Davison "public
trust" theory for saving what became the Florissant Fossil Beds National
Monument.53 Jacqueline Weaver and Hap Dunning undertook similar
initiatives to incorporate the public trust doctrine into the water law of
Texas and California, respectively. I
These efforts tend to be highly entrepreneurial.55 For example,
Dunning's fingerprints are all over California's public trust doctrine. He
was the author of a 1977 report for the Governor's Commission to Re-
view California Water Rights, 6 advisor to the attorneys who worked on
the Mono Lake case," and organizer of a conference that brought to-
gether scholarship on the topic. 8
The gradual growth of natural resources damage actions is another
example of creative mimicry. 9 Douglas Kemp Mertz pointed out that
since 1977, Alaska has enforced a dollars per gallon penalty on oil
4& See generally Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500-17 (1998). The creative artists
included Nicholas Yost and Kenneth S. Weiner.
49. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
50. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 91-378 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2751.
51. See generally Nicholas C. Yost, Don't Gut Worst Case Analysis, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,394 (Dec. 1983).
52. See, e.g., Letter from William Goldfarb, Professor, Rutgers, The State University of New
Jersey, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (July 15, 1998)
(on file with the University of llinois Law Review).
53. See V. YANNACONE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES §§ 2.8-.14 (1972); see
Davison, supra note 42.
54. See Electronic mail from Harrison C. Dunning, Professor, University of California at Davis
Law School, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Jan. 15,
1998) (on file with the University ofIllinois Law Review); Electronic mail from Jaqueline L. Weaver,
Professor, University of Houston Law Center, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of
Washington School of Law (Mar. 13, 1998) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review).
55. See Dunning, supra note 54.
56. See id.
57. See id. See generally National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d
709 (Cal. 1983).
58. See Dunning, supra note 54; see also Harrison C. Dunning, Foreword: The Public Trust Doc-
trine in Natural Resources Law and Management: A Symposium, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 181, 183
(1980). Articles growing out of the conference include Harrison C. Dunning, The Significance of Cali-
fornia's Public Trust Easement for California's Water Rights Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 357, 399
(1980).
59. See Letter from Douglas Kemp Mertz, Attorney, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, Uni-
versity of Washington School of Law (Mar. 9, 1998) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Re-
view).
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spillers.' Moreover, the 1989 spill of the Exxon Valdez facilitated a trend
toward monetary compensation for environmental damage that is not
easily quantified.6' According to Mertz:
[T]he point is that we have now put into law concepts of value
which center on existence rather than use and on preservation
rather than economic exploitation. It is not clear where all this is
going to end up, but I think we have seen a shift in recognition of
what values are legally protected that could not have been pre-
dicted very long ago.62
Victor Flatt,63 Howard Latin,' and E. Donald Elliot65 made their
creative extensions the old-fashioned way- by undertaking empirical
studies of what laws and doctrines mean in fact. It is no trivial question to
ask, as these writers have, whether enforcement is an urban myth,'
whether international environmental law is a well-publicized shell,67 and
whether one of the most frequently cited cases of the age, Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,' is an empty incanta-
tion.69
William Buzbee used the permit model to refine the idea of an ap-
proval process for contamination cleanup volunteers to harness the in-
centives of CERCLA potentially responsible parties.7" There is a similar
form of creativity in the reformulation of traditional equitable reme-
dies.71 For example, Ronald H. Rosenberg cited Judge Robert Merhige's
handling of the Kepone releases into the James River in the 1970s.n
Merhige had:
approved a deal that sent the money [from an $8 million civil pen-
alty] to create the Virginia Environmental Endowment (a small
foundation headquartered in Richmond, Va.) that has since sup-
ported a wide variety of important environmental research and
education that has done much in the region to improve environ-
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. See Victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River Runs Through It (The Failure of Enforcement in the Clean
Water Act), 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (1997).
64. See Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform
Standards and "Fine Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985); Latin, supra note 13.
65. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984.
66. See Flatt, supra note 63, at 27-28.
67. See HOWARD LATIN, THE MIRAGE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (forthcom-
ing).
68. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
69. See Schuck & Elliot, supra note 65, at 1058-59.
70. See Buzbee, supra note 14. See generally William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose: Volun-
tary Contamination Cleanup Approvals, Incentives, and the Costs of Indeterminable Liability, 80 MINN.
L. REV. 35 (1995).
71. See Rosenberg, supra note 13.
72. See id.
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mental conditions and raise environmental awareness. This became
an early structural SEP [supplemental environmental project].73
C. Optimists
Optimism is an essential ingredient for breaking new ground and
trying new ways, and unwarranted optimism is everywhere in environ-
mental law. The Environmental Defense Fund, for example, was
founded on the certainty that the courts would be receptive to sound sci-
ence. The Fund swerved in new directions when it came under the influ-
ence of the economic incentives movement and was prepared to take up
negotiations when this prospect appeared on the horizon.
There is nothing new about negotiated settlements and consensus-
based decisionmaking, of course, but there is novelty in their extensions
to regional environmental conflict and their particularized designs. This
is also true of germ-line innovation because it serves as the basis for fur-
ther growth and evolution.
Carl Ullman, director of the Klamath Tribes' Water Adjudication
Project, reported: "It has taken considerable creativity to develop an al-
ternative forum to the traditional water courts and to get the state, the
United States, and private water interests to be willing to give the alter-
native a try."74 Yet Ullman is optimistic about the prospects:
[The alternative process] seems to be working, at least to the extent
that all the relevant parties, some of whom have a history of vio-
lence, have been coaxed to the table to talk. It is still early in the
process and it is hard to tell where this new path leads, though I am
confident that something good will come of it. The tribes for whom
I work and the other water users [in the Klamath Basin] will be bet-
ter off than if they had simply taken to the courts. It would be easier
to claim a "creative moment" if we knew how it was going to come
out, but just getting the alternative forum put together makes me
feel we have accomplished something.75
Donald Large offered an example of optimism that could not be
denied.76 Large was one of the first environmental litigators in the United
States,77 along with Jerry Kalur,78 Tony Roisman,79 Albert Forsyth,' and
73. Id.
74. Letter from Carl Ullman, Director, Water Adjudication Project, The Klamath Tribe, to Wil-
liam H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (May 21, 1998) (on file with
the University of Illinois Law Review).
75. Id.
76. See Large, supra note 31.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
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David Sive.1 Large related the following story about the famous standing
case of Sierra Club v. Morton:2 The Supreme Court, which had denied
certiorari in the five cases the Sierra Club had won, granted certiorari in
the one case that the Sierra Club lost.83 "So we KNEW we were going to
win-just KNEW it!!" Large recalled.' He bet a case of good Bordeaux
on the outcome.85 Eventually, he lost86 but not for long. The "upshot"
was, Large stated:
that we raced back to the District Court, which had been as strongly
on our side as the Ninth Circuit was against us, got a TRO within 24
hours to gain time to add a bunch of individuals as plaintiffs, and
eventually won the case. Mineral King Ski Resort never got built.8 7
Optimism, of course, cannot survive independently of experience.
Naivit6 is strongly selected against in the real world. Environmental law
rollbacks do not go unnoticed. Among environmentalists, a special con-
tempt is reserved for riders repealing legislation - they violate some
norm of fair play; and for judges considered to be ideologically suspect -
the ones chosen for their anti-environmental creed and who strictly ad-
here to it. These folks are thought to offend the judicial touchstone of an
open mind.
But experience is also tempered by optimism. Many believe that
with the genie of relaxed standing let out of a bottle in the early 1970s,
there will be no turning back in the long run, the Supreme Court to the
contrary notwithstanding. It is thought that the legal culture will never
settle for a little bit of standing. Many see the NEPA as strong and se-
cure, having survived sniping by a Supreme Court that hurt only its own
reputation. Others point to sudden and sweeping legal movements - like
those that occurred under the CERCLA and the ESA- that are so
broad-based and multifaceted that they overwhelm the hierarchical (and
even old-fashioned) chain of command found in the court systems.
The environmental movement is too undisciplined and fragmented
to be discouraged by the resentful voices of authority. As Oliver Houck
optimistically expressed:
What I remain most impressed by in our field is that good ideas
come from humble and unexpected origins, that the en-
viro[nmental] mo[ve]ment is truly free enterprise at its best, and
that the institutionalized legal and academic law players have
tended to follow and, very usefully, to promote, synthesize and le-
81. See id.
82. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
83. See Large, supra note 31.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. Id.
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gitimize -but only rarely to lead -what has been a truly unique,
law-based, grassroots revolution.'
D. Symbolists
Saying it the right way, capturing the proper metaphor, is an impor-
tant part of the creative success. Zygmunt Plater attributed the enormous
influence of Judge Skelly Wright's Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Commit-
tee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission opinion89 not so
much to its timing (which was impeccable -a clear "pioneering" oppor-
tunity) but to its literary force.' As Plater put it: "How did Skelly Wright
get the inspiration to characterize the [Nuclear Regulatory Commission]
as a foot-dragging funeral procession? That phrasing launched more
ships than Helen of Troy."9'
Professor Robert Glicksman reminded us that eloquence is an in-
dispensable part of the appeal of the Wilderness Act.' As Glicksman
noted:
[The Act's] definition of wilderness and its commitment to pre-
serving it unimpaired for future generations are as awe-inspiring as
statutory text is likely to be. It is impossible to calculate how many
hours of pleasure humans have and will enjoy and how many plant
and animal species have avoided degradation or destruction as a di-
rect result of the Act's implementation.93
Who invented the phrase "environmental law?" Priority is probably
lost in the shadows of history. The term was widely used in the first gen-
eration of casebooks that appeared in the early 1970s.94 One deserving
discoverer is David Sive, who organized the 1969 Airlie House Confer-
ence in Warrenton, Virginia, where "environmental law" was much dis-
cussed.' Professor R. Lisle Baker tells a story (possibly apocryphal)
about Vic Yannacone and his invention of the term "environmental law"
in one of the early DDT cases.' Yannacone took his cue from the objec-
tion of opposing counsel: "Your honor, how do I respond to this kind of
88. Houck, supra note 4.
89. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
90. See Plater, supra note 1.
91. Id.
92. See Glicksman, supra note 23. The Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1994),
was, incidentally, authored by a nonlawyer, Howard Zahnhiser.
93. Glicksman, supra note 23.
94. See generally FRANK P. GRAD ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL: PRIORITIES, POLICIES,
AND THE LAW (1971); EVA H. HANKS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY: CASES &
MATERIALS (1974); LouiS L JAFFE & LAWRENCE T. TRIBE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1971).
95. See Letter from David Sive, Professor, Pace London Law Program, to William H. Rodgers,
Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Mar. 5, 1998) (on file with the University of
Illinois Law Review).
96. See Letter from R. Lisle Baker, Professor, Suffolk University Law School, to William H.
Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Apr. 17, 1998) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Illinois Law Review).
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claim? There's no key number I can look it up under!"' Turning to Yan-
nacone, the court replied: "Well, what does he look it up under?"9 Re-
sponded Yannacone, with a surge of sudden and anxious insight: "Well,
your Honor, he could look it up under environmental law." ' The court,
turning to opposing counsel: "Yes, why don't you look it up under envi-
ronmental law?"1'
Moreover, there are at least three inventors of the phrase "an um-
pire blandly calling balls and strikes," which was used to describe the fer-
vor of the Federal Power Commission (FPC) in the famous 1965 Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC case.10' Inventor number one
was Charlie Ross, dissenting FPC commissioner."° Inventor number two
was Judge Paul Hays, author of the Scenic Hudson opinion.103 Inventor
number three was Harvey Goldschmidt, Judge Hays's law clerk at the
time." The significance of this "umpire" metaphor is that it gave rise to
the so-called balls-and-strikes doctrine that requires agencies to act af-
firmatively to protect the environment and raises environmental issues to
a preferred status in the courts. °5
The phrasemakers are everywhere in environmental law, although
derivation and origin are occasionally difficult to detect. The respondents
in this project identified a few symbolic phrases:
"Sue the Bastards!"1°6
"Cradle to Grave' '1°7
"Debt-For-Nature Swaps"'0 8
"Environmental Racism!""
"Helpless Giants"'' 0
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. Had he looked, this lawyer would have found nothing until 1972. To this day, "environ-
ment" is included in "health and environment" in West's key number system. Conversation with Mr.
Craig Larson, West Group (Oct. 1999).
101. 354 F.2d 608,620 (2d Cir. 1965).
102. See Costonis, supra note 19.
103. See id.; Scenic Hudson, 354 F.2d at 611.
104. See id.
105. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under
Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO. L.J. 699,718-24 (1979).
106. This is the Yannacone phrase. It has been fully appropriated by the "wise use" backlash
movement. See generally DAVID HELVARG, THE WAR AGAINST THE GREENS: THE "WISE USE"
MOVEMENT, THE NEW RIGHT, AND ANTI-ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLENCE (1994). There is no ownership
here. Nobody says, "sue the other bastards!" The name "wise use of Washington" was purloined by
David Ortman, a long-time staffer of Friends of the Earth.
107. Letter from Robert F. Blomquist, Professor, Valparaiso University Law School, to William
H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Mar. 13, 1998) (on file with the
University of Illinois Law Review).
108. Id.
109. Latin, supra note 13.
110. Plater, supra note 1.
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"Tightly Wrapped Integrated Conservation Strategies (TWICS)"'11
"Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (SLAPP) ''I1 2
"Would you flood the Sistine Chapel?"'13
This list can be extended indefinitely- for example, "property as
community" from the eloquent pen of Eric Freyfogle 4 and "Moral Out-
rage versus Cool Analysis" from the impressively designed and popular
second-generation casebook of Robert Percival and coauthors."5
These formulations often come in a moment of inspiration - fre-
quently called the "Aha!" moment. Thus Andy Stahl- described by
Denise Antolini as the "man behind the curtains" for the Sierra Club Le-
gal Defense Fund'16 - received his inspiration for the spotted owl cam-
paign from a casual, back-of-the-napkin population-biology discussion
with Russ Lande. 17
The old Refuse Act Permit Program case is called Kalur v. Resor"8
because the lawyer's name was Jerry Kalur, and Jim Moorman would not
approve of filing the case in the name of the Sierra Club."' The Palila20
case is named Palila because attorney Michael Sherwood thought the
name of the bird had a nice ring to it.'2 ' "I have never heard him take
credit for it," Fred Cheever wrote. 22 "It helped alter the public percep-
tion of endangered species lawsuits and gave us some memorable case
names."12 Similar occasions of sudden inspiration gave us the idea of the
medical monitoring fund and of the exhibit in Overton Park that under-
scored the practice of "knocking down houses right up to the line of the
park.' 1
24
111. Latin, supra note 13.
112. Letter from George (Rock) Pring, Professor, University of Denver College of Law, to Wil-
liam H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Jan. 14, 1998) (on file with
the University of Illinois Law Review).
113. Plater, supra note 1.
114. ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, BOUNDED PEOPLE, BOUNDLESS LANDS: ENVISIONING A NEW LAND
ETHIc 7 (1997); ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, JUSTICE AND THE EARTH: IMAGES FOR OUR PLANETARY
SURVIVAL (1993).
115. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY
67 (2d ed. 1996).
116. Electronic mail from Denise Antolini, Assistant Professor, University of Hawaii at Manoa
School of Law, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Feb.
10, 1998) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review).
117. See id.
118. 335 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1971).
119. See Large, supra note 31.
120. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979).
121. See Letter from Fred Cheever, Assistant Professor, University of Denver College of Law, to
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Jan. 23, 1998) (on file
with the University of Illinois Law Review).
122. Id.
123. Id. To this day, cases are brought freely in the name of birds, turtles, and fish- an act of de-
fiance toward Justice Scalia? Often members of the species Homo sapiens are added to satisfy standing
formality.
124. Plater, supra note 1.
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One of the best known linguistic triumphs in environmental law is
the Pring-Canan formulation of SLAPPs- Strategic Litigation Against
Public Participation."z This formulation has brought fame, honor, and
recognition to its inventors.126 But the motivation that inspires these mo-
ments is not material or reputational rewards; it is contribution to a bet-
ter world. As George Pring wrote:
Being treated as the "discoverers" of a new litigation phenome-
non - lawsuits filed against individuals and groups for expressing
their views to government- has been heady. Great reviews, TV
talk shows, ABA Journal [c]over, conferences, Ralph Nader['s]
praise on Crossfire last week yet. But the real creative reward is the
cure: seeing hundreds of cases against Petition-Cause believers dis-
missed as judges and legislators adopt our "SLAPPS" concept and
acronym.'27
E. Geniuses
The project did not identify a large number of recognized or unrec-
ognized geniuses. Matt Kenna, however, produced evidence that Profes-
sor John Bonine is one qualifier."2 Kenna observed that Bonine:
1) created the environmental law clinic at the University of Oregon
(first one at any law school); 2) has always been a main source of
encouragement of private-public interest environmental practice; 3)
created ELAW, to provide support to grass roots groups around the
world; 4) [was the] first... to recognize e-mail as crucial to the en-
vironmental movement, including setting up various mailing lists for
activists and lawyers to network; 5) was primarily responsible for
the [University of Oregon public interest law conference, the largest
of its kind and a model for others]; and 6) generally provided a
creative model at the [University of Oregon] that students don't see
at most schools.129
Bonine himself possesses no such heady memories of his achieve-
ments. He was concerned with the "road as source" theory under which
the EPA promulgated a number of state implementation plans under the
Clean Air Act. 3 In one oral argument in the Fifth Circuit, Bonine re-
called the Attorney General of Texas jabbing a finger in his direction
while drawling to Judge Griffen Bell: "This young EPA lawyer spouts his
125. See generally GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR
SPEAKING OUT (1996).
126. See Pring, supra note 112.
127. Id.
128. See Kenna, supra note 26.
129. Id.
130. Bonine, supra note 5; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409-7410 (1994) (setting out requirements for state
implementation plans).
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facts and figures as if they are holy writ."'' In the Ninth Circuit, Bonine
and fellow lawyer Neil Prothro won a skeptical acknowledgement from
Judge Joseph Sneed: "Does the Attorney General know you two are
running around loose?' '1 32
F. Subversives
The notion that creativity is the skeptical domain of outsiders re-
ceived confirmation in the survey responses.3' "On many occasions,"
said Oliver Houck, "the creative genius was not a lawyer at all but a very
good street fighter with the ability to read English and the strength of his
or her convictions. '' "3 This special ability to start a legal fire was illus-
trated by Gilbert Zemansky, bush pilot in Alaska, whose distress at the
discoloration of streams below was the spark that ignited the campaign
that drew placer mining into the "point source" orbit of the CWA. 135
Zygmunt Plater remembered "Hank Hill [as] a chunky guy from the
hills near Chattanooga, with a greater love for the outdoors than for the
law library, and cantankerous about confronting anyone who would mess
with his environment."'" Plater continued, "[t]hrough an academic indis-
cretion, [Hill] had found it necessary to drop out of school for a semester
and had returned to school in September 1974 where he was taking my
environmental law course."' 3 7 Upon his return, Hill had to find a suitable
research topic for an environmental law paper. "'While I was flunked out
of law school,"' Hill told Plater:
I took this fish biology course and on a field trip to the last flowing
stretch of the Little Tennessee River we discovered an endangered
little perch about 2 1/2 inches long, living right in the middle of the
Tellico Dam project area. Maybe that dam would violate the En-
dangered Species Act? Do you think that's enough for a term pa-
per?'38
It was. The paper never moved past the first draft. But the case be-
came Hill v. Tennessee Valley Authority.'39
Many people working in the field of environmental law have re-
ceived inspiration from those outside of it. For example, Arthur D. Smith
noted that:
131. Bonine, supra note 5.
132. Id.
133. See Houck, supra note 4.
134. Id.
135. See 2 RODGERS, supra note 43, at 72-73; see also Clean Water Act of 1948 § 301, 33 U.S.C. §
1311.
136. Plater, supra note 1.
137. Id.
13& Id.
139. 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
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Aldo Leopold's ecological insights provided powerful arguments
for recognizing ethical obligations to the entire community of life.
The second most creative moment in history [after citizen suits] was
the adoption of both his land ethic as well as his strategy (saving
every cog and wheel) in the Endangered Species Act.'"
Douglas Mertz saw a similar "change in thinking in the [19]30s by
pioneers like Bob Marshall and the other founders of the Wilderness So-
ciety, which caused a redefinition of the values of our federal lands sys-
tem, toward multiple use and away from timber harvest and other single-
uses."
141
Outsiders, in fact, have delivered some of environmental law's
proudest achievements. William Goldfarb, a refugee from teaching in
humanities," gave credit to those who first articulated the principle of
environmental justice'43 and its international corollary, common but dif-
ferentiated responsibility.'" Goldfarb wrote:
Before this principle inspired its eponymous movement, environ-
mentalism was becoming increasingly associated with elitist and ex-
clusionary goals. Environmental Justice makes it clear that envi-
ronmentalism, like all other American social and political
philosophies, must be measured against social justice and egalitar-
ian criteria.[45]
Joseph Sax acknowledged as highly creative the work of a political
scientist,['"] Lynton Caldwell, whose "conception that became NEPA, a
law that- though mangled by the Supreme Court and underestimated by
the undersigned - has become the crucial tool for putting [the] environ-
ment on everyone's agenda.' '1 47
This "outsider" source of creativity is underscored by M. Casey
Jarman, who identified the Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawaii
County Planning Commission'" decision of the Supreme Court of Ha-
waii as the most creative moment in the history of environmental law.'49
140. Electronic mail from Arthur D. Smith, Professor, University of Idaho College of Law, to
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Feb. 17, 1998) (on file
with the University of Illinois Law Review).
141. Mertz, supra note 59.
142. See Letter from William Goldfarb, Professor, Rutgers University, to William H. Rodgers, Jr.,
Professor, University of Washington School of Law (June 2, 1998) (on file with the University of Illi-
nois Law Review). Professor Goldfarb was one of the first to teach environmental law outside of a law
school setting. See id.
143. See id. The sociologist, Robert Bullard, is a well-known name in this regard
144. Id. In international environmental law, Lakshman Guruswamy is a recognized creative out-
sider.
145. Id.
146. See Sax, supra note 18.
147. Id.
148. 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1995).
149. See Letter from M. Casey Jarman, Associate Professor, University of Hawaii at Manoa
School of Law, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Mar.
24, 1998) (on file with the University ofIllinois Law Review).
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The case placed a protective environmental easement on lands through-
out the state of Hawaii. 5 ' The case was:
the last in a series of decisions that affirmed the constitutional,
statutory and customary rights of native Hawaiians to gather natu-
ral resources on both private and government-owned lands. I think
this one is the most important of that series because it's the one that
finally "hit home" with the development community and resulted in
the galvanizing of many groups within the Hawaiian community to
strengthen their commitment to protecting and practicing their cul-
ture. It has become such a rallying cry for native Hawaiians that the
politically powerful development interests have been unable to suc-
ceed in legislatively restricting the gathering rights. 5'
G. Leveragers and Opportunists
There are no environmental lawyers who misunderstand leveraging
(creating "much from little") and no good ones who are insensitive to
opportunism. Oliver Houck observed: "Very rarely have environmental
law innovations come from academia .... The creativity in our field still
comes from that petri dish which is its practice."152
Leveraging is seen everywhere in environmental law. Denis Binder
gave credit to the "unknown lawyer" who realized "you could leverage
the penalty clause of the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision to get
polluters to make tax deductible contributions to environmental groups
in settlement of the citizen suits." '153 Jim McElfish identified the "permit
blocks," best known under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act,"'54 that disallow permit approvals for a facility owner with unresolved
violations elsewhere.'55 This is an incentive accelerator with few equals.
Ken Abraham reminded us of the creative leverage in the judicial deci-
sions holding that the "pollution exclusion" in standard-form compre-
hensive general liability insurance policies did not preclude liability for
gradual pollution.'56 This little trick of reading "unexpected" into the
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. Houck, supra note 4.
153. Letter from Denis Binder, Professor, Chapman University School of Law, to William H.
Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Mar. 4, 1998) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Illinois Law Review).
154. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994).
155. See Electronic mail from Jim McElfish, Senior Attorney, Environmental Law Institute, to
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Mar. 5, 1998) (on file
with the University of Illinois Law Review) (noting that the "EPA's versions of this are weak tea at
best"); see generally JAMES M. MCELFISH, JR. & ANN E. BEIER, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF
COAL MINING: SMCRA'S SECOND DECADE (1990).
156. See Electronic mail from Kenneth Abraham, Professor, University of Virginia School of
Law, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Mar. 24, 1998)
(on file with the University of Illinois Law Review); see also KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING
RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1986).
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"sudden and accidental" clause removed a requirement of short duration
and "probably resulted in tens of billions of dollars worth of insurance
coverage for the cost of hazardous waste cleanup.' 5' 7"" Michael Blumm
saw the stick-in-the-spokes prospects in the Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning Conservation Act's (the Northwest Power Act's) super-
deference provisions to the fisheries agencies and the Indian tribes.'58
Further, Eric Glitzenstein invented the theory that off-road vehicles
(ORV) causing ecological devastation in the Big Cypress National Pre-
serve were engaged in "discharge" to wetlands through the mechanism of
the ORV tires. 59 Glitzenstein also won access to the working papers of
the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (which lacks decisionmaking
power) on the theory that it was an agency."6° I went down this path my-
self in Lombardo v. Handler.6' That was a deliberately designed (albeit
unsuccessful) attempt to transform all committees of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences into Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) "advi-
sory committees."' 62
Cases great and small include the element of strategic leveraging.
There were a dozen pressure points in the spotted owl litigation, but one
of the important ones was the protection of diversity provisions in the
National Forest Management Act.163 This court-based campaign, Victor
Sher recalled, "was unprecedented in its geographic scope, diversity of
legal theories, political controversy, and effective ecological impact."'"t
American Lawyer called the case the "most important public lands man-
agement litigation in this country's history.' 65 The ABA Journal said the
157. Abraham, supra note 156.
158. See Electronic mail from Michael Blumm, Professor, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis
& Clark College, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Jan.
21, 1998) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review) (referring to the Northwest Power Act,
Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (1980) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 839)).
159. See Glitzenstein, supra note 16 (citing Florida Bio-Diversity Project v. Kennedy, No. 95-50-
FTM-24D (N.D. Fla. 1995)). "We reached a settlement with the National Park Service, in which the
agency agreed to develop a comprehensive ORV management plan that would minimize and mitigate
ORV impacts." Id.
160. See id.
161. 397 F. Supp. 792 (D.D.C. 1975), affd, 546 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
162. See id.; Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C.A. app. § 3(2) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999).
163. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B); see M.J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 350-70 (3d ed. 1997); Victor M. Sher, Travels with Strix: The Spotted Owl's
Journey Through The Federal Courts, 14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 41, 43-44 (1993). See generally Alyson C.
Flournoy, Beyond the "Spotted Owl Problem:" Learning from the Old-Growth Controversy, 17 HARV.
ENVrL. L. REV. 261 (1993).
164. Letter from Victor M. Sher, Attorney, Miller & Sher, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor,
University of Washington School of Law (May 27, 1998) (on file with the University of Illinois Law
Review).
165. Roger Parloff, Liti-slation: How the Timber Industry Got its Local Congressmen to Fix its
Cases, AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 80; J. Lyle Denniston, The Spotted Owl Takes Center Stage, AM.
LAW., June 1995, at 92.
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lawsuits produced a "dramatic new direction in forest policy" for tens of
millions of federal acres, "forcing an end to business as usual."'I
Thomas J. Schoenbaum reported the use in litigation of "two levers
at once" '67 in the famous New River case."6 One lever was direct attack
on the FPC license in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.169
The tactic was to challenge the pumped storage project on energy con-
servation grounds -"before Vermont Yankee put an end to this idea."'7"
Schoenbaum continued:
I knew that we were liable to fail With the FPC challenge, but this
case would give us time to implement the second strategy of using
the Scenic Rivers Act to block the dam. We started a state cam-
paign first and got the state to designate the New as a scenic river.
We filed suit to block the dam on this basis in the district court of
North Carolina. 171
"It didn't work,' 72 Schoenbaum added, "but we delayed the project
long enough to get Congress to pass a scenic river designation which did
preserve the river. A rare victory. "173
Opportunity frequently beckons in the wake of disaster. Murray
Rait wrote from Melbourne, Australia:
I think you should also include catastrophes which did (and still) fo-
cus world feeling -like the complete bombing of cities in [World
War II] like Hamburg, Warsaw, Dresden, Rotterdam, etc. (cultural
heritage) and the Minemata Bay scandal in Japan (heavy metal
pollution). These catastrophes have been incredibly instructive to
generations who have followed. 74
Zygmunt Plater added the example of the Regional Citizens' Advi-
sory Councils (RCACs) that were a product of the 1989 Exxon Valdez
spill. 175 These councils:
166. Jon Jefferson, Timmmberr: How Two Lawyers and a Spotted Owl Took a Cut Out of the
Logging Industry, A.B.A. J. 80, 81 (1993).
167. Letter from Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Professor, University of Georgia School of Law, to
William H. Rogers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Apr. 1, 1998) (on file with
the University of Illinois Law Review); see also THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, THE NEW RIVER
CONTROVERSY (1979).
168. North Carolina v. Federal Power Comm'n, 533 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (concerning the
propriety of a grant of power to build a hydro-electric project on the New River).
169. See Schoenbaum, supra note 167.
170. Id. (referring to Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978)).
171. Id.
172. Id.; see Federal Power Comm'n, 533 F.2d at 703.
173. Schoenbaum, supra note 167.
174. Electronic mail from Murray Raff, Professor, University of Melbourne, Australia, to William
H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Feb. 2, 1998) (on file with the
University of Illinois Law Review).
175. See Plater, supra note 1. The story appears in Zygmunt J. B. Plater, Keynote Essay: A Mod-
ern Political Tribalism in Natural Resources Management, 11 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1 (1990).
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were made part of the settlement with Exxon, funded by [an] an-
nual two million dollar subsidy from the oil company, and subse-
quently written into [the Oil Pollution Act of 1990], a remarkable
new pluralistic institutional device. Harry Bader, whose brain-
storming had spawned the idea, was named the head of a statewide
citizens advisory council on hazardous pollutants which was a re-
markable experiment until the industrial lobby in the Alaska legis-
lature had recouped enough political momentum to overturn the
experiment in 1995.176
Michael Baram cited the examples of the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration's 1985 Hazard Communication Standard177 and
title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA), which were prompted, respectively, by the asbestos litigation
and the Bhopal tragedy.1' 8
Strategic land acquisition is often a creature of opportunity. Lisle
Baker led one effort in Newton, Massachusetts, where citizens took the
initiative to save a seventy-one acre private golf course by buying it at a
mortgage foreclosure sale and then. negotiating an arrangement with the
city to take over the property for use as a public golf course.179 The proc-
ess involved "limited land development, rezonings, federal open space
funds, use of betterment assessment on abutting land, the possibility of a
federal income tax charitable deduction, and four years of effort."'" In
Washington, Mitch Friedman of the Northwest Ecosystem Alliance is in
the middle of a $13.1 million fundraising campaign to buy 25,000 acres of
the Loomis Forest to save it from the chainsaws recommended by the
current owner and manager, the Washington Department of Natural Re-
sources.18
1
Opportunity is also the stuff of litigation. Jan Goldman-Carter gave
an explanation for the Corps of Engineers' "Tulloch Rule" that was
thought to save tens of thousands of wetland acres and stream miles since
it went into effect in 1993:
The need for this change began to become apparent in the mid-
1980s when well heeled developers discovered they could avoid 404
permit requirements by first draining wetlands with a system of
ditches and then filling them once they were no longer wet and
176. Plater, supra note 1; see Oil Production Act of 1990 § 5002(d), 33 U.S.C. § 2632(d) (1994)
(establishing regional citizens' advisory councils).
177. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1999).
178. See Baram, supra note 43.
179. See Baker, supra note 96; see also R. LISLE BAKER & NORMAN H. WOLFE, NEGOTIATED
DEVELOPMENT AND OPEN SPACE PRESERVATION: A CASE STUDY OF NEIGHBORHOOD PURCHASE
AND ULTIMATE CITY ACQUISITION INVOLVING PARTIAL DEVELOPMENT, BETTERMENT
ASSESSMENTS AND FEDERAL TAX BENEFITS (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy ed., 1984).
180. See Baker, supra note 96.
181. See Jacob H. Fries, Loomis Forest Reappraisal Is Next Step To Preservation, SEATTLE TIMES,
July 7, 1999, at B1; Lynda V. Mapes, Bid to Save Loomis Faces July I Deadline, SEATTLE TIMES, June
1, 1999, at Al.
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therefore no longer subject to CWA jurisdiction. They could avoid
triggering the CWA discharge requirement by sealing dredge buck-
ets and dumping the dredge material into trucks to be transported
to upland sites. While there was still some fallback of dredged ma-
terial into the wetland being drained, the Corps often excluded
these dredging activities as involving only "de minimis discharges,"
ignoring the huge wetland and stream impacts that resulted.182
Using the Freedom of Information Act, Goldman-Carter discov-
ered:
a truly egregious example of this practice in coastal North Carolina.
The developers first applied for a 404 permit to fill hundreds of
wetland acres for an upscale residential, commercial, and golf
course development. Controversy swirled around the proposal, and
it was clear the developers would have difficulty getting their full
project permitted. Instead, with the Corps' knowledge, they drained
hundreds of wetland acres through a system of drains that criss-
crossed large wetland areas. The Corps exempted the drainage ac-
tivities as involving only de minimis discharges. Once the wetlands
were "de-watered," the Corps confirmed they were no longer sub-
ject to 404 jurisdiction. The developers came back in and filled at
wil. 183
Goldman-Carter, as counsel for the National Wildlife Federation,
explained that she:
prepared the suit and brought it on behalf of [the National Wildlife
Federation] and the [North Carolina] affiliates. Knowing that win-
ning the suit would only change the Corps' behavior in [North
Carolina] and possibly the Fourth Circuit, we pursued a settlement
that would entail promulgation of a nationwide rule modifying the
de minimis rule and directing the Corps districts to regulate drain-
age and channelization where a discharge and demonstrable im-
pacts occurred."8
The considerable benefits of the Tulloch rule were negated by the
recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in National Mining Association v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers." The outsiders' creativity stands little chance, it seems,
against the insiders' authority.
Vancouver, Washington attorney John Karpinski seized his oppor-
tunity by filing a lawsuit alleging over 200 separate violations by Clark
County's municipal sewage treatment plant that is adjacent to Salmon
182. Letter from Janice L. Goldman-Carter, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of
Washington School of Law (Mar. 9, 1998) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review) (dis-
cussing North Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Tolloch, an unpublished settlement in the early 1990s,
which led to a modified definition of "discharge of dredged material").
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 145 F.3d 1399,1401 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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Creek and discharges into the Columbia River." The county was in the
process of upgrading its sewage treatment plant at the time the lawsuit
was filed, according to Karpinski, 87 and
thus [the county] kept arguing the case was moot. They argued they
would never violate again. My reply was "if you say you'll never
violate again, then you'll sign a Federal Consent Decree saying
you'll never issue another building permit while the plant is in non-
compliance with the Act." Their reply was "we can't do that for one
violation." My reply was "why not do it for two?" To make a long
storyshort, we entered into a Federal Consent Decree that prohib-
ited the County from issuing any development permits if they vio-
lated any permit standards in three of four consecutive wet weather
months ... In exchange, the fine that the county had to pay was
minimal. Sums of money were prescribed in the Consent Decree for
pollution prevention and stream restoration- including the clean-
ing of salmon spawning gravel with the use of the Department of
Fisheries "gravel gertie."
The county was directed to develop an informational brochure,
which has been produced under the heading of "Exploring Salmon
Creek." 89 This is a scientifically accurate stream protection document.Y
H. Paradigm Shifters and Domain Openers
Opening of new domains and redirecting traditional ones have oc-
curred repeatedly in the practice of environmental law. Virtually every
respondent to the survey offered examples of new techniques, novel in-
stitutions, doctrinal variations, and recalibrated frameworks. In the cate-
gory of new techniques can be found Irma Russell's work on the creative
role of public opinion,' Claire Cummings's invention of cultural conser-
vation easements,1" M. Casey Jarman's workbooks that are an outreach
tactic for explaining environmental laws to the native Hawaiian commu-
nity, 93 Joel Mintz's use of personal interviews to establish a permanent
186. Letter from John S. Karpinski, Attorney, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of
Washington School of Law (Feb. 17, 1998) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review); see also
Clark County Natural Resources Counsel v. Clark County, No. C92-5176-C (E.D. Wash. July 23, 1993)
(unpublished consent decree).
187. See Karpinski, supra note 186.
18& See id.
189. Id.
190. See id.
191. See Letter from Irma Russell, Professor, University of Memphis School of Law, to William
H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Feb. 28, 1998) (on file with the
University of Illinois Law Review); see also I. Russell, The Role of Public Opinion, Public Interest
Groups, and Political Parties in Creating and Implementing Environmental Policy, 23 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,665 (1993).
192. See Cummings, supra note 2.
193. See Jarman, supra note 149. The workbooks are entitled "Kapa'a Mahope 0 Ka'Aina" and
"E Alu Like Mai I Ka Pono." See id.
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"institutional memory" on EPA enforcement,"' Robert Goldstein's con-
struction of the "Virtual Environmental Law Library" on the Internet,95
Ronald Rychlak's resort to humor to broaden the base of the environ-
mental movement,"9 and the Chemical Manufacturers' Association's de-
velopment of codes of management practices that are viewed as a model
of what companies voluntarily should do."9
Novel institutional arrangement is a frequent consequence of both
legislative innovation and big-case settlement. The appearance of the
RCACs in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 is but one example.' 98 The James
River settlement gave birth to the Virginia Environmental Endow-
ment.19 9 The project owner of Coeur d'Alene Mines in Alaska negotiated
an agreement with environmental groups that conceded important pow-
ers of comanagement, including input into design, access, monitoring
authority, and enforcement leverage. 200 Among other things, the agree-
ment:
* Fixed water quality standards that could not be changed even if per-
mit terms or federal standards were weakened;
* Forbade mixing zones, variance, or other standard-avoidance tech-
niques;
* Prohibited use of cyanide on site and required an automatic mine
shutdown in the event of a discharge of toxic substances;
194. See Letter from Joel Mintz, Professor, Nova University School of Law, to William H. Rod-
gers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Jan. 9, 1998) (on file with the University
of Illinois Law Review). See generally JOEL A. MINTz, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES
AND HARD CHOICES (1995).
195. See Letter from Robert J. Goldstein, Director of Environmental Programs, Adjunct Profes-
sor of Law, Pace University, to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of
Law (Jan. 15, 1998). The library is found at Pace Virtual Environmental Law Library (visited Apr. 2,
2000) <http://www.law.pace.edu/env/vell6.htmIl>. Another important database (Environmental Law &
Policy abstracts) has been organized by John P. Dwyer and Peter S. Menell, University of California,
Berkeley.
196. See Letter from Ronald J. Rychlak, Professor, University of Mississippi School of Law, to
William H. Rodgers, Jr., University of Washington School of Law (Feb. 25, 1998) (on file with the
University of Illinois Law Review). See generally Ronald J. Rychlak, Changing the Face of Environ-
mentalism, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 115 (1996); Ronald J. Rychlak, The Lighter Side of the Green
Movement: The Three Stooges as Early Environmentalists, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 35 (1995).
197. See Baram, supra note 43.
198. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§
2701-2719, 43 U.S.C. § 1642, and scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.); see also Plater, supra note 1.
199. See Rosenberg, supra note 13.
200. See Mertz, supra note 59. Only two (of five) environmental groups voted to accept the
agreement along with two commercial fishing organizations; the agreement was, therefore, submitted
to the company with partial ratification. Thus:
there it is-potentially a breakthrough agreement, potentially a new paradigm that other mining
companies [and other large project proponents] would be pressured into following, a way to inject
public interest groups into monitoring and enforcing governmental permits; intense opposition
even from within environmental ranks; and now the company itself backs away from it. This cer-
tainly ranks as creative. Whether it also ranks as a great achievement or just a waste of time, we'll
soon know.
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" Conditioned any material change of project description upon concur-
rence by environmental groups;
" Gave environmental groups access to the site and to environmental
records, including copies of all monitoring reports;
" Granted environmental groups $2000 per month to hire an inde-
pendent mine monitor with free access to the site;
" Granted environmental groups another $25,000 per year to investi-
gate spills, upsets, or other anomalies;
* Established a "rapid settlement fund" to be administered by a fishing
organization to settle claims of up to $10,000 by any commercial fish-
erman damaged by the company's activity;
* Required posting of substantial performance and damage bonds ex-
tending ten years past the end of reclamation;
* Called for contribution of $1.5 million toward construction of a new
high school; and
" Incorporated all permits into the agreement to facilitate enforce-
ment.201
Doctrinal movement is nicely illustrated by the rise and fall of sub-
stantive NEPA. Thomas Schoenbaum was involved in what was chrono-
logically the first substantive challenge - to a water project (the Jordan
Dam) near Chapel Hill, North Carolina.2' The draft environmental im-
pact statement "was about four pages long, as I remember," said
Schoenbaum. More specifically:
[u]sing experts, we assembled a body of substantive evidence
showing the dam was economically as well as environmentally un-
wise. The essence of our challenge I put in my casebook using
Maynard Huffschmidt's affidavit. I think we convinced the District
Court in North Carolina. We got an injunction based on procedural
deficits, but it was really because the judge bought our argument on
substantive review. But we could never convince the Fourth Circuit.
I think the Court of Appeals agreed with us, but [it was] unwilling
even to reach the issue. On remand the district judge gave us a lot
of sympathy but held against us on the substantive review issue.2 3
The Jordan Dam project was completed in 1981.' 0
Donald Large extended the substantive NEPA story by informing
us that in 1972-73 the Corps of Engineers was looking for some pre-1971
Id.
201. Id.
202. See Schoenbaum, supra note 167 (discussing Conservation Council of North Carolina v.
Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973), on remand, 435 F. Supp. 775 (M.D.N.C. 1977)).
203. Id. The Huffschmidt affidavit is found in THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & RONALD H.
ROSENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW 347 (3d ed. 1996).
204. See North Carolina Div. of Water Resources, Jordan Lake Water Supply Allocation (last
modified Dec. 2,1998) <http://dwr.ehnr.state.nc.us/jordan/index.htm>.
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approved projects to defeat NEPA on nonretroactivity grounds.2 °' "One
they came up with," Large recalled, "was a proposal to dam the Little
Miami River in southern Ohio, between Lebanon and Cincinnati.""
"This is a gorgeous little river," Large added. It is:
scenic but with a lot of gentle rapids for canoeists to enjoy and a
thriving bass population. The dam across it had been authorized by
Congress in 1938, as part of a system of fourteen dams they author-
ized after the terrible floods of 1937-38 along the Ohio River. It
was never built, because a couple of years later, it was realized that,
if all fourteen dams were built, it would raise the level of the Ohio
River forty [feet] at the point it passed Cincinnati and completely
flood the city .... [These findings] did not deter the Corps in 1972,
however.2°
According to Large, the Corps was:
beginning to move ahead on this dam when we sued- I represented
the local group free of charge when they could not afford to hire a
lawyer, mainly because I loved canoeing and fishing the Little Mi-
ami .... The District Court held that NEPA applied and bounced
the case back to the Corps.' °
"We thought the case was over," remembered Large, yet the dismissal:
was not with prejudice. And [six] months later the Corps was back
with their version of an impact statement. (Remember, this was the
early days [of] NEPA). What they produced was an artist's rendi-
tion of the dam and the viaduct they proposed to build (honest, this
really happened!!!) to send the Ohio River 100 feet above ground,
over the top of the city of Cincinnati!2'
"Now," concluded Large:
this was in a courtroom in Cincinnati which would be flooded, or
under a giant viaduct, if the Corps had its way. So the court had had
enough and threw them out with prejudice. This was also one of the
very early cases holding that there were substantive rights under
NEPA. l°
"I've been a lawyer over thirty years now," Large said, "and I feel that
saving the Little Miami is the one thing I truly accomplished in the law.
And you know what? That's enough to make me happy with my ca-
reer."
211
Environmental law has entered new domains in a number of sur-
prising ways. Seattle attorney Mickey Gendler reminds us that the Cen-
205. See Large, supra note 31.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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tury Freeway litigation in Los Angeles preceded the environmental jus-
tice movement by many years.212 The settlement in the case included
"specific provisions for hiring minority workers from the community af-
fected by the highway project. '213 This civil rights-environmental hybrid
is comparable to the NAFTA side agreements that, as Dan Farber
pointed out, can "set a precedent for using trade benefits as leverage for
environmental protection.
214
Michael Gerrard underscored the gate-crashing force of CERCLA
strict liability "that was joint, several, absolute, merciless, knowing no de-
fenses or perceptible limits. Never mind that (to my knowledge) no bank
was ever actually held liable for passively loaning to a contaminated fa-
cility."2 '5 Gerrard continued:
The widespread notion that anyone who handled, saw, smelled, or
heard of [hazardous substances] could be liable to clean [them] up
became an overwhelming force for both good and bad. For good,
most importantly, it became the world's greatest engine for waste
minimization. The stunning decline in generation of RCRA wastes
since the early 1990s is largely because people were so afraid of
CERCLA liability that they didn't want to generate or handle these
wastes. CERCLA liability also, almost single-handedly, created the
practice of conducting environmental site assessments. 16
Furthermore, Gerrard wrote:
CERCLA liability stifled innovation in the development of hazard-
ous waste treatment technologies because companies did not want
the liability risk; it caused untold hundreds of thousands of slightly
contaminated properties in inner cities to languish; it dictated mas-
sive inefficiency and transaction costs in ineffective cleanups (the
flip side of all those billable hours); and because of its indiscrimi-
nate wrath against the morally innocent and puny, as well as the
wicked and the massive, it created a great deal of ill will toward the
entire concept of environmental regulation.217
Michael Baram perceived a distinct paradigm shift in the right-to-
know laws, especially title III of the 1986 SARA. i This empowered per-
sons "exposed to hazardous chemicals" and abridged the "corporate
212. See Gendler, supra note 22.
213. Id.
214. Electronic mail from Daniel A. Farber, Professor, University of Minnesota Law School, to
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Jan. 30, 1998) (on file
with the University of Illinois Law Review).
215. Letter from Michael B. Gerrard, Attorney, Arnold & Porter, to William H. Rodgers, Jr.,
Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Jan. 20, 1998) (on file with the University of Illi-
nois Law Review).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See Baram, supra note 43 (referring to the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 94-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)).
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ability to withhold such information., 219 Michael Gerrard elaborated on
the power of this disclosure paradigm by noting:
[i]n the early 1990s Lexis and Westlaw started offering computer
databases allowing users to type in any address or company name
and see whether those locations or firms were involved with any
federal or state Superfund Sites, [toxic release inventory] releases,
leaking [underground storage tanks], RCRA permits, etc. This
greatly expanded the impact of environmental regulation by allow-
ing potential purchasers, lenders, and others to see immediately
who and what bore the environmental scarlet letter.220
Another watershed event in law that can claim the status of para-
digm shift is the recognition and arrival of ecosystem management. 21
This recommendation to approach problems holistically was reinforced
in the spotted owl litigation.22 It was undergirded by what is known to-
day as "sustainable" development. 223 Daniel Esty reminded us that:
the Rio Earth Summit represents a watershed in environmental
policymaking and an important creative moment in environmental
law. One could point to the introduction of the term "sustainable
development" in the Brundtland Report of a few years earlier, but I
think the Rio Earth Summit helped to drive home the need to focus
on the challenge of environmental protection in the context of eco-
nomic development, as embodied in the term "sustainable devel-
opment." The Rio Earth Summit also helped to transform our focus
on environmental issues so that we now understand that there are
no pure domestic or local issues and that the environmental chal-
lenge is one of broad-based ecological interdependence. These
linkages extend not only across airsheds and watersheds but at
some scale (such as climate change) reflect a globalization of the
environmental challenge.224
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. This is explored well by Robert B. Keiter, Ecosystems and the Law: Toward an Integrated
Approach, 8 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS, 332 (1998); see also RECLAIMING THE NATIVE HOME OF
HOPE: COMMUNITY, ECOLOGY, AND THE AMERICAN WEST (Robert B. Keiter ed., 1998); THE
GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM: REDEFINING AMERICA'S WILDERNESS HERITAGE (R.B.
Keiter & M.S. Boyce eds., 1991); VISIONS OF THE GRAND STAIRCASE-ESCALANTE: EXAMINING
UTAH'S NEWEST NATIONAL MONUMENT (Robert B. Keiter et al. eds., 1998); Martin H. Belsky, The
Ecosystem Model- Mandate for a Comprehensive United States Ocean Policy and Law of the Sea, 26
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 417 (1989) (elaborating same).
222. See Sher, supra note 163, at 78-79.
223. See Letter from Daniel Esty, Director, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, to
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (June 23, 1998) (on file
with the University of Illinois Law Review).
224. Id. See generally MARIAN R. CHERTOW & DANIEL C. ESTY, THINKING ECOLOGICALLY:
THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1997).
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Robert Adler pointed out how the end point that paradigm shifters
know as "pollution prevention" was an outgrowth of earlier develop-
ments that can be described as least-cost planning.2' Adler wrote:
Initiated in the area of energy planning (by David Roe, Amory
Lovins and Ralph Cavanaugh, among others), later water use and
now transportation planning, [least-cost planning] gave the most
real meaning to the consideration of alternatives required under
NEPA and other laws and regulations. Once this idea took root, it
was no longer a question of which power plant configuration to
build or which dam site to choose but which combination of de-
mand-side and supply-side strategies could meet a given societal
need at the lowest economic and environmental cost. I think later
ideas of pollution prevention were simply the logical outgrowth of
these initiatives. 2
26
The most admired of all the environmental laws is the NEPA.227 It is
admired for its form, its structure, and its robustness.2 28 It is praised for its
eloquence of formulation and for the cleverness in the way it was at-
tached to existing agency mandates. 9 It has been emulated by a hundred
other initiatives.230 It is celebrated for any number of paradigm shifts-
from simple public policy evaluation to impact assessment to comprehen-
sive rationality to ecological experimentation to public participation to
integrated decisionmaking. I Even the part of the NEPA that did not
work - section 101 - is extolled for its embrace of the principles of stew-
ardship (the public trust), nondegradation, cultural and biodiversity, re-
cycling, sustainable use, and even (with a small stretch) environmental
justice ("a wide sharing of life's amenities").1 2 William Goldfarb thus de-
scribed section 101:
This is the most visionary, comprehensive, compassionate, and ar-
ticulate statement of the environmentalist credo that has yet been
pronounced. This [section] has had little importance in environ-
mental litigation, but it has had, through the educative function of
law, monumental significance in validating, expressing, and direct-
ing environmental law and the philosophy of environmentalism.233
225. See Letter from Robert W. Adler, Associate Professor, University of Utah College of Law,
to William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (May 26, 1998) (on file
with the University of Illinois Law Review).
226. Id.
227. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 801-09 (2d ed. 1994).
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 809-15.
232. Id. at 801-02; see also National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331
(1994).
233. Goldfarb, supra note 143.
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I. Workaholics
Hard work is not so much a distinguishing as a necessary condition
for creativity in environmental law. Oliver A. Houck had a nice way of
explaining:
I guess if I get to Heaven it will be for sixteen years of hard slogging
on the Atchafalaya Basin until we stopped a Corps plan to drain it
and got a new one to buy it... but stories like that abound, thank
goodness, or there would be few natural places left anywhere.'
The motivation for these types of efforts is rarely fame, fortune, or fash-
ion; it is satisfaction in having saved something important.
III. THE CREATIVE MOMENTS
The nominees for the ten most creative moments in the history of
environmental law, culled from survey responses, are:
1. 1962, the publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, 5 for
starting it all.
2. 1965, the Scenic Hudson case,2 6 which opened an era of judicial
activism in environmental protection.
3. 1965, the founding of the Environmental Defense Fund 7 (with
others to follow), for giving environmental advocacy an institutional
home.
4. 1969, enactment of the NEPA,238 which is still the Magna Carta of
environmental law.
5. 1970, enactment of the first citizen suit measure (in the Clean Air
Act) 9 that opened the door to citizen questioning of official illegality.
6. 1970, publication of Joseph Sax's public trust article,2' which is
most admired for its articulation of the principle of stewardship.
7. 1973, amendments to the ESA 241 that protected nature with what
some scholars have called the "strongest environmental law in the
world. "242
234. Houck, supra note 4.
235. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962); see also FRANK GRAHAM, SINCE SILENT SPRING at
vii (1970) (placing "Silent Spring in the context of its time" and recounting "the progress of the pesti-
cide controversy on which it had so great an impact").
236. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Powers Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965).
237. See Videotape: Environmental Vision: The Power of Positive Solutions (Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. 1990) (hosted by John Chancellor, narrated by Susan Sarandon) (on file with author).
238. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1994).
239. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604. Other indispensable ingredients of the citizen suit movement were the
decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), and the book by CHRISTOPHER D. STONE,
SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR NATURAL OBJECTS (1974).
240. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Inter-
vention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
241. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
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8. 1980, the enactment of the CERCLA243 that sponsored a para-
digm shift with a new regime of strict liability.
9. 1982, recognition of the environmental justice movement2" that
successfully fused the civil rights and ecological movements.
10. 1992, the Rio Earth Summit245 that connected environmental is-
sues with world trade and development.
242. Richard Delgado & Noah Markewich, Rodrigo's Remonstrance: Love and Despair in an Age
of Indifference- Should Humans Have Standing?, 88 GEO. L.J. 263,286 (2000) (book review).
243. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. § 9601.
244. Most agree that the movement started with protests over an EPA decision to site a landfill
for PCB-contaminated soil in Warren County, North Carolina. See, e.g., Robert D. Bullard, Environ-
mental Justice for All, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LING. 281,281 (1994).
245. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 294-313 (1998).
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